This paper analyzes empirically whether or not the prices and related behavior observed in California's wholesale electricity market this past summer are consistent with what would be expected in a workably competitive market. Some have argued that the huge increase in wholesale electricity prices observed during the Summer 2000 can be fidly explained by "market fimdamentals" such as rising natural gas prices, increased loads in California, a reduction of supplies available for import into California due to higher loads elsewhere in the Western States Coordinating Council (WSCC) and poor hydro conditions in the Northwest. Our analysis incorporates these "market fundamentals" and seeks to quantifj their effects on wholesale market prices in a competitive market, We find that actual wholesale market prices far exceed competitive benchmark prices that reflect this summer's natural gas price, demand, and import conditions. Thus, these "market fundamentals" cannot explain the huge increases in wholesale market prices observed during Summer 2000.
Previous analyses of wholesale market prices in California have not systematically taken into account the costs of tradeable allowances for NOX emissions which must be held by affected sources in the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) pursuant to the Regional Clean Air Initiatives Market (RECLAIM) program. We find that the rising NOX allowance prices observed during Summer 2000 help to explain some of the gap between actual market prices and estimates of competitive benchmark prices which ignore NOX emissions credit prices. Over the summer, the gap between our estimates of competitive benchmark prices and actual prices observed narrows due largely to the substantial increase in NOX RTC prices.
After taking all of these factors into account --higher gas prices, higher loads in California, reduced imports, and higher NOX RTC prices --our analysis leads us to conclude that truly competitive prices in the California electricity market would have This''price gap'' provides a rough measure of the effects of market power and related market imperfections reflected in wholesale market prices in California during the June through September 2000 period.
We also present a preliminary analysis of the potential impact on wholesale electricity prices resulting from the implementation of two NOX emissions control strategies. This enhanced NOX control initiative, including both emissions controls on gas turbines and the installation of selective catalytic reduction, reduces competitive benchmark prices during the June through September 2000 period by over $20/MWh on average. This translates into a reduction in payments to electricity suppliers of roughly $1.5 billion during the June through September period. These estimates assume that NOX credit prices are unaffected by these emissions control initiatives. However, further reductions in electricity prices would likely result from these strategies since they are likely to lead to lower NOX credit prices in addition to reducing the number of NOX credits required to generate electricity.
Our empirical analysis has two major components.
First, we estimate competitive wholesale market benchmark prices and compare these benchmark prices to the prices that were actually observed. The more the observed price exceeds the competitive price benchmark, the more one can presume that either market power was being exercised or some other source of market imperfection has interfered with the competitive interplay of supply and demand. The competitive price benchmark that we utilize is the short run marginal cost of supplying electricity from the last unit that clears the market in each hour. Comparing realized prices with marginal supply costs in this way is a widely accepted method for measuring the presence of market power, and is especially useful for examining market prices in commodity markets with homogeneous products like spot electricity markets. This approach to measuring market power in wholesale electricity markets has been applied previously in studies of the California market. These studies relied on confidential data to which we do not have access.
Second, we investigate the physical operation of generating units located in California during the June-September period to see if there is evidence of supply withholding behavior. Public data are presently available to examine generator operation on an hourly basis from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through the month of June. Southern California Edison supplied us with information from the WSCC on hourly generation by California plants for the months of June through September.
From a theoretical perspective, withholding capacity can be used to exercise market power. We show that profit maximizing behavior during high demand periods for suppliers holding a portfolio of generating units with diverse marginal supply costs is consistent with unilateral capacity withdrawal in California even under otherwise competitive conditions. Our examination of the data shows that many of the price setting units produced much less energy than could have been produced at marginal costs below observed market clearing prices. This behavior cannot be explained by the demand for ancillary services by the CAISO. Therefore, either the units were suffering from operational problems or they were being withheld from the market.
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